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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (5) Autor Berck, Peter (1) Chong, Alberto E. (1) De La O, Ana (1) Karlan, Dean S. (1) Messer, Kent D. (1) Perloff, Jeffrey M. (1) Poe, Gregory L. (1) Pokrivcak, Jan (1) Schulze, William D. (1) Wantchekon, Leonard (1) Warziniack, Travis (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Voting (5) D72 (2) Political Economy (2) Accountability (1) Altruism (1) C91 (1) C92 (1) Common Agricultural Policy (1) Community/Rural/Urban Development (1) Corruption (1) D64 (1) D73 (1) D81 (1) D82 (1) D83 (1) Elections (1) European Union (1) H41 (1) Information (1) Institutional and Behavioral Economics (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Conference Paper or Presentation (2) Working or Discussion Paper (2) Working Paper (1) Ano 2012 (1) 2010 (1) 2008 (1) 2002 (1) 1984 (1) País United States (5) Idioma Inglês (5)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 5 Primeira ... 1 ... Última A dynamic analysis of marketing orders, voting , and welfare AgEcon Berck, Peter; Perloff, Jeffrey M.. Published in: American Journal of Agricultural Economics, v.67:3, August 1985, p.487-496 [S1/J6] Giannini Foundation paper 730 Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Marketing agreements; Marketing orders; Voting; Marketing. Ano: 1984 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43306 Did local government structure kill small town America? AgEcon Warziniack, Travis. This article examines the provision of public goods in an urban area and the effect voting has on the level and location of amenities throughout a city. It is particularly appropriate for small communities that must finance economic development projects with limited funds. The work presented is a result of working with rural communities throughout America that have seen their historic downtowns deteriorate as big box retail grows on the urban fringe. I find this shift in community development may be a result of the way local economic development is financed and projects are decided upon. Specifically, I find significant welfare losses associated with voting for a public good in space. Small public projects that would lead to community-wide welfare... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Open space; Spatial economics; Referendum; Voting; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Land Economics/Use; Political Economy; R10; R14. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/60956 Institutions and EU Decisions-Making: the 'Power' of the European Commission AgEcon Pokrivcak, Jan. I develop a two-stage political economy model that explicitly models the complexity of decision-making in the European Union on the Common Agricultural Policy, and I derive how the institutional design affects the outcome and the influence of the various agents involved, and the likelihood of political stalemate. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Political economy; European Union; Common Agricultural Policy; Voting; International Development. Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24862 Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes AgEcon Chong, Alberto E.; De La O, Ana; Karlan, Dean S.; Wantchekon, Leonard. Does information about rampant political corruption increase electoral participation and the support for challenger parties? Democratic theory assumes that offering more information to voters will enhance electoral accountability. However, if there is consistent evidence suggesting that voters punish corrupt incumbents, it is unclear whether this translates into increased support for challengers and higher political participation. We provide experimental evidence that information about copious corruption not only decreases incumbent support in local elections in Mexico, but also decreases voter turnout, challengers' votes, and erodes voters' identifcation with the party of the corrupt incumbent. Our results suggest that while flows of information are... Tipo: Working Paper Palavras-chave: Corruption; Accountability; Elections; Voting; Information; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Political Economy; Public Economics; D72; D73; D82; D83. Ano: 2012 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/121640 The Value of Private Risk Versus the Value of Public Risk: An Experimental Analysis of the Johannesson et al. Conjecture AgEcon Messer, Kent D.; Poe, Gregory L.; Schulze, William D.. In 1996 Johannesson et al. published a paper in this journal entitled “The Value of Private Safety versus the Value of Public Safety.” Based on preliminary evidence from a hypothetical contingent valuation study, these authors argue that consumers behave as “pure altruists” and reject the notion of paternalistic preferences for safety in a coercive tax setting. These pure altruists consider the cost of a program that might be imposed on other voters when they decide whether to vote for or against public safety programs. The authors conclude that further empirical research in this area is warranted. This paper presents a set of laboratory economics experiments to test Johannesson et al.’s conjecture under controlled conditions in which participants face an... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Altruism; Risk; Voting; Public goods; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Risk and Uncertainty; D81; D64; H41; C91; C92; D72. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51141 Registros recuperados: 5 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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